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Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between foreign currency inter-
national reserve holdings and global interest rates. To guide empirical work
we solve a simple, small open-economy model with money, where the cen-
tral bank manages international reserves to smooth inflation over time. This
model shows that changes in interest rates are positively related to the tar-
get level of reserves. As a consequence interest rate hikes increase reserve
transfers, defined as the change in international reserves net of the interest
earned on reserves. Using quarterly data for 75 countries between 2000 and
2013, we document a positive relationship between interest-rate changes and
reserve transfers as a share of GDP, that is consistent with the model.
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1. Introduction
The massive accumulation of international reserves by central banks in
Asia and Latin America is one of the crucial policy issues in Pacific Rim
economies.1 This accumulation of highly liquid assets with relatively low
returns is important, as it represents foregone consumption and investment
in fast growing economies, and contributes to global imbalances in the form
of upstream capital flows.2 In this paper, we study how the holdings of
international reserves depend on interest rate shocks to the interest-bearing
assets that constitute international reserves.
Figure 1 plots the effective federal funds rate in the last 15 years together
with reserves as a share of GDP for three East Asian economies. We can
see from the graph that the growth in international reserves slowed down
substantially in the recent period of the effective-lower bound in US interest
rates. Is this the new normal for reserve accumulation? How would reserve
accumulation change if interest rates in developed economies increase? The
prospective increase in interest rates in developed economies is one of the
most significant near-future challenges for developing economies. Therefore,
understanding how reserves relate to global interest-rates is of paramount im-
portance. This paper approaches this question from a monetary perspective
and studies theoretically and empirically how international reserve manage-
1See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2003), Jeanne (2007), Aizenman and Lee
(2007) and Aizenman and Lee (2008).
2See Fukuda and Kon (2012) for an analysis of reserve accumulation on consumption
and investment, and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) and references therein for their role
in upstream capital flows.
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ment responds to interest-rate fluctuations.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To guide empirical work we solve a simple monetary model of inter-
national reserve management. The model is a traditional cash-in-advance
small-open economy, which has been used by Calvo (1987) and Burnside
et al. (2001) to study balance of payments problems, by Rigobon (2002) to
study inflation under fiscal reforms, and by Pina (2015) to study the growth
in international reserves. In the model presented in this paper, we focus on
the target long-run level of international reserves and on how interest rate
shocks may change this target. We also show how studying international re-
serve transfers, defined as international reserve changes minus interest earned
on these reserves, allows us to identify empirically the impact of interest rate
shocks on the target level of international reserves, which is empirically un-
observable.
We set up the problem of a central bank that has to finance exogenous
and stochastic foreign-currency spending shocks with inflation-related rev-
enues, such as seigniorage or deflating nominal debts. Inflation is costly and
the central bank wishes to spread costs over time. To do so, it accumulates
reserves to smooth inflation against these shocks. Besides managing the stock
of international reserves with respect to domestic shocks, the central bank
also faces external shocks to the interest rate of its interest-bearing assets.
We compare periods of low and high world interest rates and show that an
increase in interest rates increases the target level for reserves and leads to an
increase in reserve transfers. We also show that reserve transfers are decreas-
ing when interest rates are constant. These results highlight a relationship
2
  
between changes in interest rates and international reserve transfers that we
can test empirically.3
In the data section of the paper, we interpret our empirical results using
this model of international reserve management. To test whether interest
rates are associated with reserve transfers, we take advantage of quarterly
data on international reserves and global interest rates for a large panel of
economies. Data on the composition of international reserves is available
with monthly frequency starting January 2000 by the IMF Special Data Dis-
semination Standard (SDDS) Reserve Template as described in Dominguez
et al. (2012). Quarterly data on the currency denomination of international
reserves is available through the IMF database COFER for developed and
developing economies, while Wong (2007) reports a country-specific snap-
shot for 2005. We use this data to construct quarterly data on international
reserve transfers, defined as changes in international reserves net of interest
income, as well as country-specific interest rates earned on reserves. To iden-
tify the elasticity of international reserves to interest-rate shocks, we explore
that interest rate changes in developed economies are plausibly exogenous
for small developing economies. Furthermore, we benefit from within- and
cross-country variation in the types of assets used to accumulate reserves as
3We focus on a financial stability perspective on international reserve management.
Although in the model reserves are held because of a precautionary motive, similar to
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) and Jeanne and Ranciere (2011), they are not necessarily
related to foreign borrowing in the presence of sudden stops or defaults. Instead, we
explore the view that reserves represent liquid savings by a lender of last resort to support
the financial sector in crises, as in Obstfeld et al. (2010) and Dominguez et al. (2012).
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well as the currencies under which they are denominated.
Using data between 2000 and 2013, we find evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between interest-rate shocks and international reserve transfers that
is consistent with the model. Under the lens of our theoretical results, this
implies that positive interest-rate shocks increase the target levels of interna-
tional reserves for developing economies. In our baseline regression, we find
that a 1 percentage point increase in the effective interest rate earned on re-
serves is associated with an increase in reserve transfers as a share of GDP of
at most 0.2 percentage points. We document that this effect is stronger out-
side of the global financial crisis and robust to using an alternative measure
of interest rate shocks. It is also robust to including exchange rate regime
controls and country risk factors.
Previous research on international reserves and interest rates has focused
on the quasi-fiscal costs of holding reserves, in particular, on the opportunity
cost of holding reserves as measured by the difference between interest earned
on reserves and the social return of applying these resources elsewhere. Nu-
merous papers, including Heller (1966), Edwards (1985) and Hauner (2006),
have used alternative measures for this social return.4 Our results are com-
plementary to this research in the sense that we focus our attention on mea-
suring the relevant interest rate changes for developing economies, and do
not take a stance on the correct measure of the social return on capital.
Our approach is closely related to the work by Dominguez et al. (2012) and
Dominguez (2012), who use the same data on the composition of reserves
4See Hauner (2006) for an overview of this literature.
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to study how net purchases of foreign currency international reserves impact
economic performance. Instead of studying the effects of actively managing
foreign currency international reserves, we focus on the impact of external
shocks on interest rates on the target level of international reserves.
The next section solves a simple model of international reserves and in-
terest rates. Section 3 presents the data set and tests the predictions of the
model. Section 4 discusses our findings and suggests areas for future research.
2. Model
In this model we study international reserve management using the in-
flation smoothing approach developed by Calvo (1987), Rigobon (2002) and
Pina (2015). There are two optimizing agents, a central bank and a represen-
tative consumer. The problem of the representative consumer is a standard
cash-in-advance model of consumption where consumption fluctuates with
inflation. Our focus is on the problem of the central bank. The central
bank has access to a non-contingent asset to smooth inflation while facing
stochastic financial responsibilities during crises. These are denominated in
foreign currency and can take the form of banking sector support or transfers
to the government. To finance these expenses, the central bank can either
raise inflation-related revenues or use previously accumulated international
reserves. Inflation is costly, and the central bank wishes to spread the bur-
den of inflation across time. As a result, it accumulates reserves in normal
periods and uses a mix of inflation and reserves during crises.
5
  
2.1. Setup
Consider a small open endowment economy with one traded good where
time is continuous. There are two agents: an infinitely lived representative
consumer and a central bank. At any moment in time, the economy is in
one of two states. A normal state (L) and a crisis state (H). The differ-
ence between crisis states and normal states is the amount of foreign funds
demanded from the central bank, which are low in normal times and high
during crises.
2.1.1. Consumer Problem
The representative consumer maximizes the expected lifetime utility from
the consumption plan {ct}∞0 . The objective function of the consumer is given
by:
E0
∫ ∞
0
log (ct) e
−ρtdt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount factor. We assume that the consumer
receives an endowment of y every period and has access to two assets: a
foreign bond f that earns the foreign real interest rate ρ, and domestic money
holdings Mt. Money is valuable in this economy because it is useful for
consumption purposes. The opportunity cost of holding money is given by
the nominal interest rate, which corresponds to the loss of value associated
with inflation plus the return lost from not being able to apply these resources
in the foreign bond.
Let Pt represent the domestic price level at t, and pit =
·
Pt
Pt
the domestic
inflation rate (and let the international inflation rate be zero). Assume that
6
  
purchasing power parity holds, such that the exchange rate is completely
determined by inflation. Assume also that all debt is indexed to domestic
inflation.5 Then, the nominal domestic interest rate is given by: it = ρ+ pit.
The flow budget constraint of the consumer can be written as:
·
ft +
·
M t
Pt
= ρft + y − ct. (2)
In addition, the consumer faces a cash-in-advance constraint. To consume
ct, the consumer must have real money holdings
Mt
Pt
at least larger than ct.
The cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
ct ≤ Mt
Pt
. (3)
Define at = ft+
Mt
Pt
as the wealth of the consumer in real terms. Because
consumers only care about real balances, define real money balances as mt =
Mt
Pt
. As a store of value, money is always dominated by foreign assets if
it = pit + ρ ≥ 0, which we assume throughout. Thus, the cash-in-advance
constraint (3) will always hold with equality and money demand is given by
mt = ct. We can then rewrite the flow budget constraint as:
·
at = ρat + y − ct (1 + it) . (4)
Finally, the consumer’s solvency condition is given by:
lim
t→∞
ate
−ρt ≥ 0. (5)
5This implies that domestic and foreign debt are perfect substitutes for the consumer
and limits inflation-related revenues to seigniorage.
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The problem of the consumer is then to choose a sequence of {ct}∞0 , so as
to maximize (1), subject to the flow budget constraint (4) and the solvency
condition (5), given {it}∞0 , f0 and m0. The solution to this problem is greatly
simplified by the fact that the consumer has log-utility and by the assumption
that the consumer is as impatient as the market. We assume further that the
consumer has perfect foresight. Appendix A: Supplementary material shows
that the optimal solution is given by:
ct =
ρa0 + y
1 + it
, (6)
mt = ct. (7)
Equation (6) shows that consumption depends positively on wealth and
income but negatively on the nominal domestic interest rate, and therefore,
inflation. We focus now on the problem of the central bank and on the
management of international reserves.
2.1.2. Central Bank Problem
We assume the central bank is benevolent. It solves a constrained opti-
mization problem: subject to the demands of the government, the represen-
tative agent’s choices and it’s own budgetary constraints, the central bank
maximizes the representative agent’s utility. The solution is represented by
a plan for the interest rate {it}∞0 that maximizes (1). Because the agent
demands real money balances, the central bank can tax domestic agents
through inflation. With the resources obtained from seigniorage
·
Mt
Pt
, the cen-
tral bank can pay for spending gt or accumulate international reserves rt that
earn interest φt. Absent any borrowing constraint, the central bank can also
8
  
borrow from the international bond market at rate φt. However, since this
asset is not contingent on shocks to gt, the central bank does not have access
to perfect insurance.
Note that we assume that the central bank has access to different foreign
assets than the domestic consumer. In particular, we assume that the central
bank can only save in an asset that earns an interest rate that is lower than
the interest rate faced by the consumer: φt < ρ. One justification for this
assumption is to consider that central banks are only interested in highly
liquid assets such as treasuries or cash, whiles consumers can save abroad in
higher return equities. When borrowing, central banks can also have access
to lower interest rates, while private agents pay a high cost for borrowing
abroad. Because the central bank has access to a lower interest rate but
maximizes the utility of the agent, the central bank acts as an impatient
agent.
The objective of the central bank is to choose the interest rate it to
maximize:
E0
∫ ∞
0
ln (c) e−ρtdt, (8)
taking into account the optimal decisions of the representative consumer and
the stochastic process for g. To simplify the analysis, we study the case where
this expenditure takes one of two values
{
gL, gH
}
, where gH >> gL and gt
evolves according to the following Poisson process:
9
  
gt+dt =

gH w.p. q1dt if gt = g
L,
gL w.p. 1− q1dt if gt = gL,
gL w.p. q2dt if gt = g
H ,
gH w.p. 1− q2dt if gt = gH .
(9)
At any point in time, this economy will be in one of two states of nature:
in state-L, expenditure is low; in state-H, expenditure is high. We think of
L-periods as normal economic times, and H-periods as crisis periods. A crisis
occurs with probability q1, and once it occurs, it is over with probability q2.
In this paper, we do not distinguish between debt, banking or currency crisis.
Empirically, these crises come associated with costs for the central bank and
the government as Burnside et al. (2001), Burnside et al. (2006) and Laeven
and Valencia (2013) show.
The external budget constraint of the central bank is given by:
·
rt = φrt +
·
Mt
Pt
− gt. (10)
In exchange for financing gt the central bank gets domestic debt (bt),
either issued by the government or by financial institutions.6 The balance
sheet of the central bank is then given as:
bt + rt = mt, (11)
6This variable can also be interpreted as domestic credit. We assume that these assets
are indexed to inflation to avoid any incentive of the central bank to reduce their real
value through inflation.
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where we assume that the net worth of the central bank is zero for simplic-
ity. Replacing the balance sheet given by equation (11) into the external
constraint of the central bank given by equation (10), we can obtain:
·
bt = φbt + gt − (pit + φt)mt. (12)
Furthermore, we assume that the central bank is constrained to have
positive reserves, that is, r ≥ r = 0.
The problem of the central bank is to choose the inflation rate pit, and the
domestic nominal interest rate it = pit+ρ to maximize the consumer’s utility,
taking into account the influence of the interest rate on private consumption.
This problem can be summarized as follows:
max{it}
∫ ∞
0
log
(
ρa0 + y
1 + it
)
e−ρtdt,
s.t.
·
bt = φbt + gt − it + φt − ρ
1 + it
(ρa0 + y) ,
it ≥ 0, rt ≥ 0, gt given by (9) ,
limT→∞bT e−ρT = 0.
2.2. Solution
Appendix B.1: Supplementary material shows that the solution to this
problem is given by a system of two differential equations, where we omit
time subscripts for simplicity:
11
  
∂iL
∂b
=
(ρ− φ) (1 + iL)+ q1 (iL − iH)
φb+ gL − iL+φ−ρ
1+iL
(ρa0 + y)
, (13)
∂iH
∂b
=
(ρ− φ) (1 + iH)+ q2 (iH − iL)
φb+ gH − iH+φ−ρ
1+iH
(ρa0 + y)
. (14)
Together with the boundary conditions:
limb→−∞ij (B) = −1, j = L,H (15)
φb¯+ g =
i¯H + φ− ρ
1 + i¯H
(ρa0 + y) (16)
b¯ =
ρa0 + y
1 + i¯H
(17)
The boundary conditions in the high state given by equations (16)-(17)
play an important role in our analysis. They put limits on iH and b when
approaching from below b¯, as a consequence of the constraint on reserves
that r ≥ 0. When the central bank runs out of reserves at b¯t, it is forced to
rely completely on inflation to obtain necessary funds, and the interest rate
is given by i¯Ht . We can further simplify these two conditions:
i¯H =
ρ (ρa0 + y) + g
ρa0 + y − g , (18)
b¯ =
ρa0 + y − g
1 + ρ
. (19)
Furthermore, holdings of international reserves are represented as:
rt = mt − bt, (20)
12
  
where mt =
ρa0+y
1+it
. We define accumulation of international reserves net of
interest earned as reserve transfers RTt:
RTt =
·
rt − φtrt. (21)
We are now ready to present the main results from the model. Before
deriving analytical results we use a numerical example to develop intuition.
Figure 2 plots the solution of the model described by equations (13)-(17) for
an example parametrization. The top panel plots the inflation rate during
normal times (piL, solid blue line) and crises (piH , dashed red line) against
the level of reserves as a share of GDP. We also refer to these as the managed
inflation rates. Also plotted are the inflation rates for which
·
bt = 0 in both
states, which we refer to as the flexible inflation rates. The bottom panel
plots reserve transfers during normal times (RTL, solid blue line) and crises
(RTH , dashed red line) against the level of reserves as a share of GDP. Also
plotted is a line where RT = 0.7
Focus first on normal periods, represented by the solid blue lines in both
panels. We can see that, during normal times, managed inflation is larger
than the flexible inflation rate as long as reserves are below their target level.
Below this target level of reserves, reserve transfers are positive. When a crisis
hits, for any level of international reserves, the inflation rate goes up and the
central banks spends previously accumulated international reserves. Reserve
transfers are now negative. As the central bank spends international reserves,
7Details for the numerical solution are available in Appendix B3: Supplementary ma-
terial.
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inflation is increasing while reserve transfers approach the constraint.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We turn now to the analytical results. In particular, we first show that
there exists a target level of reserves in normal times as implied by
·
bLt =
·
rLt =·
mLt = 0.
Proposition 1. There exists a domestic debt level bs such that
• In state-L if bt > bs, the central bank increases the level of international
reserves and
·
bLt < 0, but if bt < bs, the central bank decreases reserves
and
·
bLt > 0.
• If bt = bs,
·
bLt =
·
rLt =
·
mLt = 0.
• In state-H the central bank always reduces the level of international
reserves as long as bt < b¯.
The proof is presented in Appendix B.2: Supplementary material.
This result establishes the existence of a target level of international re-
serves in state-L that balances the central bank’s impatience with the need
to finance costly financial crises.8
8Note that we have solved the model assuming there is a borrowing constraint on
how many reserves a central bank can have access to in a crisis. If the central bank
could borrow from abroad, everything else equal, the target level of international reserves
would be lower. One important difference between developing and developed economies is
that central banks in developed economies have access to short-term financing in foreign
14
  
We can now study how this results affects reserve transfers. Reserve
transfers are given by RTt =
·
rt − φrt. Replacing ·rt we obtain:
RTt =
·
mt +
pit (ρa0 + y)
1 + pit + ρ
− gt. (22)
In normal times, gt and
·
mt are small, and the correlation between RT and
pit is positive. In crises, however, gt is large. Furthermore, the central bank
increases the inflation rate which depresses consumption and the demand for
real money balances, making
·
mt negative. Then, the correlation between pit
and RTt turns negative.
9
For a given interest rate φ, the model implies that reserve transfers are
decreasing when reserves are below the target level of reserves. This is true
independently of the level of desired reserves. In the next section, we study
how shocks to the interest rate affect reserves in the long-run.
2.3. Shocks to returns to interest earning assets
In this section we focus the analysis on shocks to φ. Given that our in-
terest is in the long-run, we focus our analysis on the target level of reserves.
Consider two levels for φ, both lower than the interest rate faced by the con-
currency from other central banks, in the form of swap arrangements (Obstfeld et al., 2009;
Aizenman et al., 2011). Likewise, if the government could issue more debt or collect more
taxes, one would expect that the demands from the central bank g would be lower, which
would also reduce the central bank’s reserve target. Crucially, this access to debt markets
or tax revenues would have to be of similar liquidity as the central bank’s international
reserves.
9For small gt and
·
mt,
∂RT
∂pi =
Xt(1+ρ)
(1+pi+ρ)2
> 0, and higher inflation translates into higher
RT . For high gt and negative
·
mt, RT is negative even though pit is positive.
15
  
sumer: φL < φH < ρ. The previous section showed that, for a given interest
rate in normal times, reserves transfers are decreasing when reserves are be-
low the target level. Above the target level, reserve transfers are increasing.
In crisis times, reserve transfers are always increasing.
Suppose the economy is initially in a low interest rate environment. Fig-
ure 3 shows that, in normal times, an interest rate hike leads to an increase
in reserve transfers. In crisis times, an increase in the interest rate will also
lead to an increase in reserve transfers, but this effect is smaller the closer
the central bank is to the lower bound on reserves. In other words, the
model predicts a relationship between changes in interest rates and reserve
transfers, in particular, it predicts that exogenous increases in interest rates
should cause an increase in reserve transfers. The intuition behind this result
is that higher interest rates make it easier to sustain a larger a long-run level
of international reserves, as everything else equal, they make international
reserves less costly. In the next section, we test this relationship using a
panel data set of emerging countries.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
3. Empirics
In this section we evaluate empirically how shocks to the interest rate
earned by foreign-currency reserve assets affect international reserve accu-
mulation. Given that these returns have a direct impact on international
reserves accumulation, we focus on international reserve transfers. Interna-
tional reserve transfers are defined as the change in international reserves
16
  
minus interest income and are therefore not mechanically affected by inter-
est rate shocks, beyond the effect on target levels of reserves. We take the
perspective that fluctuations in interest rates of foreign currency interna-
tional reserve assets are exogenous for developing economies and that central
banks are actively managing their total reserve stocks. Building on this per-
spective, we can then identify the impact of interest rate shocks on reserve
transfers by exploring cross- and within-country variation in the exposure to
interest-rate shocks. To do so, we use data on the composition of foreign cur-
rency international reserves into different types of assets and denominations.
We combine this data with relevant interest rates for different types of asset
and denominations, and use it to investigate empirically if the mechanism
identified in the model is present in the data.
3.1. Measuring reserve transfers
We follow Dominguez et al. (2012) and use the naming conventions from
the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Reserve template.
Let the stock of international reserves be given by:
IRt = ForexRt +Goldt + SDRt + IMFt +Othert, (23)
where ForexR = SECt+DEPOt are international foreign currency reserves
that can be held as securities or deposits, Goldt represents gold holdings,
SDRt represents country holdings of Special Drawing Rights, IMF captures
the country’s position with the IMF, while Other captures other reserve
assets. Total reserves can grow from purchases of foreign currency assets, in-
terest earned on existing assets, capital gains on existing assets and increases
in non-currency asset holdings. Then, the change in reserves is given by:
17
  
∆IRt = ∆ForexR + ∆NonCR, (24)
where ∆NonCR = ∆Gold + ∆SDR + ∆IMF + ∆Other represent non-
currency reserves. We focus our empirical analysis on foreign currency re-
serves ForexR as they capture the type of liquid assets that central banks
are more likely to use in the event of a crisis, as motivated by our model.
An additional reason to focus on foreign currency reserves is that Dominguez
(2012) shows that non-currency reserves do not change frequently. We can
then decompose data on international foreign currency reserve changes as:
∆ForexR = φsSEC + φdDEPO + ∆ŜEC + ∆D̂EPO, (25)
where, ∆ŜEC+ ∆D̂EPO represent non-interest related changes to holdings
of international reserves.10
We can see from equation (25) that there is a direct impact of interest
rates for securities and deposits/currency on ∆ForexR. In order to study
whether interest-rate shocks affect the long-run level of international foreign
currency reserves and their accumulation, we focus on reserve transfers, that
is, international reserves net of interest earned on reserves:
10Dominguez et al. (2012) further decomposes ∆ŜEC+ ∆D̂EPO into two components,
one representing active management from net purchases of securities and deposits, and
the other from valuation changes in existing securities and deposits: ∆ŜEC+∆D̂EPO =
∆PSSEC + ∆PSDEPO+ ∆V ALSEC + ∆V ALDEPO. In this paper, our objective is not
to study the impact of intervention on output or exchange rates and therefore we do not
distinguish between passive and active reserve accumulation.
18
  
ForexRT = ∆ForexR− (φsSEC + φdDEPO)
= ∆ŜEC + ∆D̂EPO.
According to the model presented in the previous section, increases in
φs or φd should lead to an increase in ForexRT . Data on ∆ForexR can
be readily obtained from the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)
Reserve template, which also provides aggregate quarterly data on SEC and
DEPO for each country. The biggest challenge is to measure the relevant
interest rates as they depend on the choice of currencies and assets by central
banks, for which we have only approximate information. We turn to the
measurement of interest earned and interest rate shocks in the next section.
3.2. Measurement of interest and interest-rate shocks
In this section we measure interest earned on reserve assets and the rel-
evant interest-rate shocks for the countries in our sample. We take the per-
spective that country-specific factors determine the choice of currencies and
maturities in which central banks accumulate international reserves.11 Al-
though data on the decomposition between securities and deposits/currency
11Lim (2007) shows that exchange rate fluctuations lead to portfolio re-balancing, such
that reserve currency shares are relatively stable. Beck and Rahbari (2011) study optimal
central bank currency portfolios in a minimum variance framework with sudden stops.
They find that the US dollar is a better hedge against sudden stops in Asia and Latin
American, while the Euro is superior in Emerging Europe. Wooldridge (2006) documents
that the composition of international reserve assets has changed within countries, both in
terms of composition and currency denomination.
19
  
is available from the SDDS, unfortunately we do not have country-specific
information on the currency composition of these assets for the full sample,
nor on the exact assets held by each country. Therefore, we construct two
different measures of country-specific interest rate shocks as proxies.
To proxy for returns to securities and returns to deposits we follow Dominguez
et al. (2012) and collect 10-year government bond yields and 3-month inter-
bank yields for the United States, Japan, Great Britain and the Euro-area.12
The first measure follows Dominguez et al. (2012). We use the Currency
Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database to ob-
tain currency weights for two groups of countries: “advanced” and “emerging
and developing economies”. We combine this data, data on asset composi-
tion from SDDS and returns for securities and deposits for four main reserve
currencies to compute the country-specific interest rate as follows:
interesti,t = 100
∑
c
(
wt,cφ
s
t,cSECi,t + wt,cφ
d
t,cDEPOi,t
)
ForexRi,t
, (26)
where i represents country, c = USD,EUR,GBP, Y EN , wt,c captures each
currency weight at time t and φjt,c captures the interest rate on asset j = s, d,
at time t for currency c.
Variation in this interest rate captures different holding patterns between
securities and deposits/currency across countries and within countries, but
note that variation in currency denomination is exclusively between “ad-
vanced” and “emerging and developing economies”. Figure 4 plots yields for
12We obtain this data from the respective central banks. See the Appendix C.1: Sup-
plementary material for details on the series used.
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one unit of foreign currency international reserves held as securities (10-year)
and deposits/currency (3-month) weighted by currency share for “advanced”
and “emerging and developing economies”. This figure shows that variation
in currency composition between the two types of countries is small. In the
empirical specifications, we will focus on within-country variation in reserve
transfers and explore how interest rate shocks affect reserve transfers after
controlling for country fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the country
level in all regressions. Using this approach we can compute interest earned
on reserve assets ( φ̂sSEC + φ̂dDEPO
)
and obtain foreign currency inter-
national reserve transfers ForexRT = ∆ForexR −
(
φ̂sSEC + φ̂dDEPO
)
.
We can also obtain the relevant interest rates for each country. Combining
this data, we obtain quarterly data between 2000 and 2013 for 75 countries
which we classify as advanced or developing according to the World Economic
Outlook (WEO).13
Our alternative specification uses data from Wong (2007) for 23 countries
for which we can obtain the currency breakdown in international reserve
holdings for 2005. We assume that these weights are constant throughout
our sample and compute:14
interestAlti,t = 100
∑
c
(
w˜i,2005,cφ
s
t,cSECi,t + w˜i,2005,cφ
d
t,cDEPOi,t
)
ForexRi,t
, (27)
where c = USD,EUR,GBP, Y EN and w˜i,2005,c captures a country-specific
currency weight in 2005. This alternative measure of interest rates allows
13See Appendix C.2: Supplementary material for the lists of countries.
14See Appendix C.3: Supplementary material for the list of countries.
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for cross-country variation in currency denomination. We present pooled
regressions with standard errors clustered at the country level, but results
with country fixed effects are similar.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
3.3. Data and country examples
Table 1 summarizes the data. Figures 5 and 6 plot the time series of the
variables of interest for countries in our sample. The shaded area represents
the global financial crisis for each country, measured as the peak-to-through
seasonally adjusted real GDP for the period after 2007 as in Dominguez
et al. (2012). Figure 5 plots transfers and interest rates for two developed
economies. Looking at Australia, it is possible to see that, with the exception
of late 2007, reserve transfers are relatively stable and close to zero, even
though interest rates fluctuate substantially. A similar pattern holds for
Japan, where with the exception of early 2004, reserve transfers are small and
stable. This suggests that developed economies may manage international
reserves for different reasons other than the ones highlighted in the model,
and therefore respond differently to interest rate shocks.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year-Quarter 3136 2000Q2 2013Q4
Reserve transfers % GDP 3136 -0.08% 1.65% -20.4% 17.4%
Interest rate 3136 3.10% 1.12% 0.23% 5.91%
Interest rate alternative 1101 3.12% 1.02% 0.23% 6.13%
Table 1: Summary Statistics for quarterly data
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[Insert Figure 5 here]
Figure 6 plots the data for two developing economies, Peru and Rus-
sia, and shows how reserve transfers fluctuate more in developing economies.
These countries also demonstrate the importance of controlling for the ef-
fects of the global financial crisis, as reserve transfers turn negative during
this period. This period highlights the buffer role that reserves represent in
these economies, in particular under the presence of concerns about sudden
stops and capital flight, which can be made worse by balance sheet currency
mismatches.15 Consider, for example, the case of Russia in 2014 where in-
ternational reserves fell by $124.1 billion, a 24% decrease from 2013. The
Bank of Russia Annual Report for 2014 states that the two main drivers
of the reduction in total reserve holdings were “foreign exchange interven-
tions and the provision of FX liquidity to resident banks” (page 39). This
report further justified these interventions with difficulties for resident banks
in refinancing external debts while facing depreciation of the ruble.16
15The simple model presented in the previous section would capture these events as an
increase in g.
16See for example, “A $9.6-billion increase in banks foreign assets ($27.9 billion in 2013)
was linked in part to the redistribution of a portion of other sectors foreign assets and the
Bank of Russia’s FX reserves in favor of credit institutions.” (page 39). Also, “Amid the
fall in oil prices and the tightening of sanctions against a number of Russian companies
in September - December 2014, further ruble depreciation and an increased exchange
rate volatility were observed. The depreciation expectations of economic agents increased
and the ruble exchange rate deviated significantly from its fundamentally justified value.
On certain days, under the floating exchange rate regime, the Bank of Russia conducted
foreign exchange interventions to promote financial stability. Net sales of foreign currency
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[Insert Figure 6 here]
Turning to the relationship between reserve transfers and interest rates,
it is possible to note that reserve transfers are larger when interest rates are
increasing. Note that this holds even before the global financial crisis. In
Peru, the increase in interest rate increase following 2005 is associated with
a higher level of transfers. In both countries, the period after the crisis is
associated with lower reserve transfers. In the next sections we test for the
relationship between interest rates and international reserve transfers using
a panel of countries and quarterly data.
3.4. Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between foreign currency international reserve
transfers and interest rates, we employ variations of the following regression:
ForexRTi,t
GDPi,t
= αi + ψt + β∆interesti,t−1 + γCrisisi,t + i,t (28)
where ForexRT
GDP i,t
represents foreign currency international reserve transfers
as a share of GDP for country i in quarter t, αi captures time-invariant
country fixed effects, ψt captures time fixed effects, ∆interesti,t−1 captures
interest rate changes as described in the previous section, and Crisisi,t is
a country-specific dummy variable that takes on a value 1 if country i is
in a crisis period in quarter t. This crisis dummy is constructed based on
peak-to-through seasonally-adjusted real GDP for the period after 2007 as
by the Bank of Russia from 11 November to 31 December 2014 amounted to $11.9 billion.”
(Page 54).
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in Dominguez et al. (2012), and is motivated by the dramatic decreases in
reserves during country-specific crisis as shown in Figures 5 - 6. We will also
consider the role of a global dummy that captures the US financial crisis in
this period. The coefficient β measures the impact of changes in interest
rate between t and t− 1 on reserve transfers at t. Note that reserve transfers
captures reserve accumulation not coming from interest earned, but from net
purchases or valuation effects of foreign currency international reserves.17
This regression is potentially subject to endogeneity concerns. One of
these concerns is that reserve accumulation in developing economies causes
low interest rates in developed economies. Another is that interest rate
changes may be associated with the valuation channel of international reserve
accumulation. This could be a problem if the central bank is passively man-
aging international foreign currency reserves, as increases in interest rates
would mechanically affect reserve transfers through the valuation channel.
To reduce concerns about reserve causation, we look at lagged changes in
interest rates, such that β measures the impact of changes in interest rates
between t− 1 and t− 2 on reserve transfers at t. If asset price valuations of
foreign currency international reserves are determined by interest rate shocks,
these effects should be contemporaneous and not captured by lags.18
17We also perform an alternative regression where we include country-specific time
trends ψc.
ForexRTi,t
GDPi,t
= αi + β∆interesti,t−1 + ψct+ γCrisisi,t + i,t (29)
18These would not be a concern if the central bank is actively managing international
foreign currency reserves, as net purchases would adjust to keep reserve transfers at the
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3.5. Results
Columns (1) - (4) in Table 2 collect the results for the regression speci-
fication given by equation (28), with country fixed effects, while column (5)
collects the results for the regression specification given by equation (29),
with country-specific time-trends and country fixed effects. We can see in
Column (1) from Table 2 that interest rate changes are positively associated
with reserve transfers, and this effect is statistically different from zero at
the 5% level. In Column (2) - (5) we interact our variable of interest with a
dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country is an advanced
economy. The coefficient β for developing countries, reported in line (1)
increases in magnitude but is less finely estimated. In Column (3) we con-
trol for country-specific crises as defined in the previous section. Column (4)
adds year fixed effects, while Column (5) reports results with country-specific
time-trends. The coefficient of interest for developing economies is positive,
although not very precisely estimated for some of our specifications. Look-
ing at column (2), the interpretation of the coefficient is that a 1 percentage
point increase in the interest rate of foreign currency international reserves
is associated with a 0.19 percentage points increase in foreign currency in-
ternational reserve transfers as a share of GDP.
desired level following valuation shocks. Also, if interest rate increases actually decrease
asset valuations, this effect would go against the effect we are studying in this paper. Re-
sults with contemporaneous interest changes are qualitatively similar but slightly smaller
and less precisely estimated. Results with an additional lag, that is, where we study the
relationship between interest changes between t − 2 and t − 3 and reserve transfers at t
are of similar magnitude to the ones we present, but less precisely estimated.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reserve Transfersi,t Year FE Country trends
∆interesti,t−1 0.163** 0.186* 0.103 0.090 0.073
(0.073) (0.110) (0.109) (0.118) (0.111)
Advanced -0.542* -0.519* -0.611** -0.699**
(0.272) (0.279) (0.294) (0.343)
Advanced x ∆interesti,t−1 -0.062 -0.059 -0.085 -0.039
(0.164) (0.161) (0.170) (0.164)
Crisisi,t−1 -0.658*** -0.895*** -0.691***
(0.201) (0.245) (0.208)
Constant -0.067*** 0.159 0.195 -0.044 0.033
(0.004) (0.114) (0.123) (0.199) (0.134)
Observations 3,136 3,136 3,136 3,136 3,136
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.028 0.047
Countries 75 75 75 75 75
Table 2: The dependent variable is Reserve Transfers as a % of GDP. The symbol x repre-
sents interacted variables. All regressions include country-fixed effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Our sample covers the global financial crisis. We account for country-
specific drains in international reserve transfers associated with decreases
in domestic real GDP, but the global financial crisis can also change the
relationship between interest rates and international reserves. The period of
extreme instability between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter
of 2009 poses a challenge as it represents a very large shock to all countries.
Table 3 collects results of a regression where the coefficient of interest β is
interacted with a dummy variable that captures the period between the third
quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. Once again, we can track our
coefficient of interest in the first line. We see that the effect of interest rate
changes is larger outside of this period of instability, and significantly different
from zero at least the 10% level for all but the specification with country-
specific time-trends. The coefficient on domestic global crisis is relatively
unchanged.19
In Table 4 we use our alternative measure of interest rates in a setting
without country fixed effects, but keeping standard errors clustered at the
country level. We omit from these regressions the United States, Germany
and United Kingdom, as these are reserve currency countries, and are left
with 20 countries for which we have larger variation on the currency denom-
ination of international reserve assets. Note that the coefficient of interest in
very similar to the full sample, suggesting that interest rate changes impact
reserve transfers.
19In Appendix C.5: Supplementary material, we report results for regressions excluding
data from 2007 onwards, and by different country groups in this period.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reserve Transfersi,t Year FE Country trends
∆interesti,t−1 0.243*** 0.315** 0.205* 0.235* 0.175
(0.081) (0.119) (0.116) (0.128) (0.118)
Advanced (Adv) -0.534* -0.510* -0.618** -0.622*
(0.272) (0.278) (0.293) (0.353)
GFCUS,t 0.017 0.064 0.220 0.342* 0.190
(0.089) (0.131) (0.144) (0.197) (0.153)
Crisisi,t -0.685*** -0.712*** -0.706***
(0.216) (0.247) (0.221)
∆interesti,t−1 x GFCUS,t -0.747*** -1.174*** -0.926** -1.092*** -0.914**
(0.262) (0.379) (0.376) (0.400) (0.382)
Adv x ∆interesti,t−1 -0.063 -0.059 -0.085 -0.039
(0.164) (0.161) (0.170) (0.164)
Adv x GFCUS,t -0.125 -0.067 -0.068 -0.042
(0.168) (0.176) (0.181) (0.190)
Adv x ∆interesti,t−1#GFCUS,t 1.039** 1.020** 1.127** 1.016**
(0.480) (0.483) (0.479) (0.488)
Constant -0.072*** 0.151 0.171 -0.037 -0.041
(0.008) (0.116) (0.121) (0.196) (0.139)
Observations 3,136 3,136 3,136 3,136 3,136
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.019 0.033 0.052
Number of countries 75 75 75 75 75
Table 3: The dependent variable is Reserve Transfers as a % of GDP. The symbol x
represents interacted variables. All regressions include country-fixed effects. GFC stands
for Global Financial Crisis. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 29
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reserve Transferst Year FE Country trends
∆interestt−1 0.225 0.325** 0.189 0.259* 0.145
(0.139) (0.130) (0.113) (0.126) (0.121)
∆interestt−1 x GFCUS -0.802* -0.563 -0.668 -0.476
(0.408) (0.469) (0.547) (0.477)
GFCUS,t 0.137 0.321 0.477 0.346
(0.174) (0.241) (0.451) (0.249)
Crisisi,t -0.855* -0.876 -0.991*
(0.492) (0.606) (0.495)
Constant -0.071 -0.078 -0.042 -0.121 -0.179
(0.076) (0.081) (0.081) (0.167) (0.216)
Observations 990 990 990 990 990
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.015 0.026 0.046
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
Table 4: The dependent variable is Reserve Transfers as a % of GDP. The symbol x
represents interacted variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6. Robustness
In this section we augment our empirical model with other considerations
that can potentially drive reserve transfers. In particular, we consider two
alternative mechanisms: exchange rate regimes and foreign-debt risk. One
alternative theory to explain the patterns of international reserves is that
they are the unintended consequence of a trade policy that tries to promote
exports and growth (See Benigno and Fornaro (2012) and Korinek and Serve´n
(2016).). We include monthly data on de facto exchange rate regimes from
Ilzetzki et al. (2010).20 If exchange rate regimes and trade policy are related
to changes in interest rates, omitting exchange rate regimes could potentially
bias our results. Looking at the first line in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5
we can see that controlling for the exchange rate regime does not significantly
alter our results.
The other explanation is closer to the mechanism studied in this paper.
If international reserves are held due to precautionary motives related to the
ability of borrowing abroad in the presence of sudden stops or default, an
increase in interest rates may lead to an increase in reserve transfers for this
motive. To control for this at the quarterly level, we use data from the ICRG
indices on the Risk of Foreign Debt. A larger value for this index indicates
a lower level of foreign debt as a percentage of GDP. Columns (3) and (4) of
20We introduce a full set of dummy variables that capture the following de facto exchange
rate regimes: (1) Pegs, currency boards or narrow horizontal bands; (2) Crawling pegs
or narrow bands; (3) Wide crawling bands and managed floating; (4) Freely floating; (5)
Freely falling.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reserve Transferst Year FE Year FE Year FE
∆interesti,t−1 0.156* 0.187 0.144** 0.282** 0.216
(0.089) (0.144) (0.072) (0.135) (0.154)
Exchange Rate Regimei,t X X X
Risk for Foreign Debti,t 0.047** 0.051** 0.089***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023)
Advanced (Adv) -1.408** -0.157 -0.697***
(0.649) (0.127) (0.246)
GFCUS,t 0.331* 0.489** 0.463**
(0.198) (0.197) (0.201)
Crisisi,t -0.734*** -0.435** -0.447**
(0.250) (0.201) (0.207)
∆interesti,t−1 x GFCUS,t -1.029** -1.292*** -1.211***
(0.397) (0.448) (0.447)
Adv x ∆interestt−1 -0.173 -0.353** -0.317*
(0.233) (0.144) (0.177)
Adv x GFCUS,t -0.035 -0.166 -0.099
(0.186) (0.186) (0.193)
Adv x ∆inti,t−1 x GFCUS,t 1.089** 1.343** 1.316**
(0.490) (0.512) (0.517)
Constant -0.271 0.304 -0.340*** -0.604*** -0.438
(0.349) (0.483) (0.128) (0.206) (0.391)
Observations 2,252 2,252 2,885 2,885 2,093
R-squared 0.003 0.049 0.003 0.033 0.050
Number of countries 70 70 67 67 64
Table 5: The dependent variable is Reserve Transfers as a % of GDP. The symbol x
represents interacted variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5 show that our results are also robust to controlling for foreign debt.21
4. Conclusion
This paper has presented a framework to think about the relationship
between foreign-currency international reserves and interest-rate fluctuations
on the assets kept as reserves. In the model, we have focused on the prob-
lem of the central bank that wishes to smooth inflation but faces shocks to
demands on its foreign liquidity. We show that increases in interest rates are
associated with increases in reserve transfers, defined as international reserve
changes net of interest earned on reserves. The model highlights how this
relationship works through changes in interest rates. Turning to the empir-
ics, we used data on currency denomination and asset composition of foreign
currency international reserves to identify shocks to interest rates earned by
different countries on their foreign-currency international reserves. We doc-
ument that between 2000 and 2013, changes to interest rates are positively
associated with reserve transfers, as predicted by the model.
We have taken the perspective that interest rate shocks are exogenous and
unexpected to developing economies. We could solve for a more complicated
model with expected interest rate shocks. The solution would fall in between
21Interestingly, we find that lower levels of foreign debt as a percentage of GDP are
associated with larger reserve transfers, suggesting reserve accumulation even as foreign
debt decreases. In Appendix C.4: Supplementary material we report that our results
are also robust to introducing other country risk variables from the ICRG: debt service,
current account, budget balance, exchange rate stability, per capita GDP, and economic
and financial risk composites.
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the two long-run solutions we have focused on, but some interesting insights
on changing probabilities of future rates could be obtained. On the empirical
side, it would be interesting to extract shocks to interest rates in developed
economies that are also exogenous in developed economies, and use these
policy surprises to study reserves and interest rates.
One challenge with our approach is that it is hard to isolate the impact
of interest rate shocks from global cycles, in particular given that our sample
includes a global financial crisis and a post-crisis world that is rather unique.
Future work may benefit from more and better data. Finally, we have fo-
cused on interest rates but omitted the role of the social return on capital.
Incorporating both dimensions of holding international reserves, costs and
returns, to compute the fiscal impact of the opportunity cost of international
reserves would provide a clearer picture of international reserve management
in a post-crisis world with potentially higher interest rates.
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Figure 1: Reserves as a share of GDP for selected countries (left axis) and the US Effective
Federal Funds Rate (right axis).
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Figure 2: The top panel plots the inflation rate during normal times (piL, solid blue line)
and crises (piH , dashed red line) against the level of reserves as a share of GDP. Also plotted
are the flexible inflation rates for which
·
bt = 0 in both states. The bottom panel plots
reserve transfers during normal times (RTL, solid blue line) and crises (RTH , dashed
red line) against the level of reserves as a share of GDP. Parameters used: φ = 0.015,
q1 = 10%, q2 = 50%, y = 1, g
H = 0.35y, gL = 0, ρ = 0.02.
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Figure 3: This graph plots reserve transfers during normal times for low and high interest
rates against the level of reserves as a share of GDP. Also plotted are reserve transfers
during crises for low and high interest rates. Parameters used: φL = 0.0125, φH = 0.015,
q1 = 10%, q2 = 50%, y = 1, g
H = 0.35y, gL = 0, ρ = 0.02.
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Figure 4: This figure plots yields for one unit of foreign currency international reserves
held as securities (10-year) and deposits/currency (3-month) weighted by currency share
for developed and emerging and developing economies.
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Figure 5: This figure plots foreign currency international reserves transfers as a share of
GDP (RTGDP) and two measures of effective interest rates on foreign currency interna-
tional reserves. The shaded area represents the global financial crisis for each country,
measured as the peak-to-through seasonally adjusted real GDP for the period after 2007.
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Figure 6: This figure plots foreign currency international reserves transfers as a share of
GDP (RTGDP) and two measures of effective interest rates on foreign currency interna-
tional reserves. The shaded area represents the global financial crisis for each country,
measured as the peak-to-through seasonally adjusted real GDP for the period after 2007.
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 Foreign-currency international reserves and global interest rates. 
 Model shows reserves target-level positively related to interest earned on reserves. 
 Reserve transfers and changes in rates allow to identify this mechanism empirically. 
 Quarterly data for 75 countries between 2000 - 2013 consistent with model prediction. 
